05 · Deployments & on-chain artifacts

Every value here is real, on Sui testnet, and sourced from DEPLOYMENTS.md and the package source. Explorer links use https://suiscan.xyz/testnet/. Built with Sui 1.73.1.

Package lineage (v1 → v2 → v3)

Ballast was upgraded in place twice. The type origin never changes, so all AgentIdentity and BallastCap objects survive every upgrade. Only the call target advances.

Version	Role	Package ID	Publish/upgrade digest
v1	Type origin (objects keyed here)	`0xe12fe8ef…d3eadf`	`uGrs6CXm…`
v2	DeepBook relink	`0x2359bc78…04be85`	`FwqPZ4oS…`
v3	Current call target, adds real Nautilus attestation	`0xb8843ab9…35511`	`HdogX6hx…`

Modules: attestation, capability, identity, trading.
UpgradeCap: 0x09cb9ba6…22b95ce
Deployer / owner: 0x82f1f58f…3508daa
Vendored Nautilus enclave package: 0x0a977985…d3ecca (publish tx HALhPScA…)

v3 adds trading::execute_trade_attested and attestation::verify_nautilus, and keeps the mock verify and execute_trade byte for byte, so the mock demo path cannot regress.

DeepBook (testnet)

Item	Value
Type origin	`0xfb28c4cb…bec6982`
Call target (pool-accepted, linked by v2/v3)	`0x22be4cad…09371a3c`
v1-linked target, rejected by live pools (abort 11)	`0x74cd5657…`
SUI / DBUSDC pool (demo market)	`0x1c19362c…ea7163a5`

Coin types: SUI = 0x2::sui::SUI · DBUSDC = 0xf7152c05930480cd740d7311b5b8b45c6f488e3a53a11c3f74a6fac36a52e0d7::DBUSDC::DBUSDC · DEEP = 0x36dbef866a1d62bf7328989a10fb2f07d769f4ee587c0de4a0a256e57e0a58a8::deep::DEEP (unused, since trading runs pay_with_deep = false).

Shared demo objects

Object	ID
AgentIdentity	`0x28eb8752…d93dd197`
BalanceManager (owned by deployer)	`0x589a3060…7224d9d7`
Honest capability (reused across runs)	`0x1f80803d…42e54ab2`

Nautilus attestation artifacts

Item	Value
EnclaveConfig (shared, trusted PCRs)	`0xd41be8d6…45ef781`
`Cap<BallastEnclave>` (deployer-owned, for `update_pcrs`)	`0x5ac2d8c9…e94f187dd`
`Enclave<BallastEnclave>` (registered TEE key)	`0xc2a17908…51ba1`
Attested enclave public key	`389fb0ebd4db1e2eb3e5fbdac9903ff852feb1f09fd445186a980b45bfd659f4`
PCR0 = PCR1	`d2f558244d778dc8c8553f3a5a10adf3e2fd146bd02e4f7b928af6906bd303dff0d6899f5b4b571f9fdaa75c5b101582`
PCR2	`21b9efbc184807662e966d34f390821309eeac6802309798826296bf3e8bec7c10edb30948c90ba67310f7b964fc500a`
EIF image	105 MB, sha256 `815308eb5314b640cd9539951e96d6f2fbfd706a57095edc1e43b17094b28e21`
Enclave host (now torn down)	`http://52.3.234.171:3000`

Transaction receipts

Real Nautilus attestation (v3)

Step	Digest	Result
`init_attestation` (registers expected PCRs)	`AbSfMc54…`	created EnclaveConfig + Cap
`register_enclave` (AWS cert chain + PCR check on-chain)	`3LRQyhW3…`	created `Enclave<BallastEnclave>`; pk stored == live pk
`execute_trade_attested<SUI,DBUSDC>`, enclave-signed SELL of 1 SUI	`2aPiwNyN…`	success, filled; reputation 5→6; `TradeExecuted`
Forged signature, bogus 64-byte sig vs the same `Enclave`	`DMUp8tHg…`	abort code 1 `EAttestationFailed`, rejected before `enforce`/DeepBook

Mock-path non-regression on v3

Action	Digest	Code
Rogue: over-spend	`3qoLuTxQ…`	5 ESpendExceeded
Rogue: over-leverage	`3MaWcQF3…`	4 ELeverageExceeded
Rogue: disallowed market	`8nASLDer…`	3 EMarketNotAllowed
Rogue: after revocation	`8kJJbnAJ…`	1 ERevoked
Honest: gated SELL fill	`BnfiqJcp…`	success, rep 4→5

Earlier real runs (same package family)

Action	Digest	Note
v2 SDK honest fill	`FMLhBke5…`	rep 3→4
v2 BalanceManager deposit (2 SUI)	`6zGc4W1G…`	funds the fill

The dashboard generates fresh real digests on every honest or rogue run. The tables above are the canonical recorded receipts. DEPLOYMENTS.md additionally records the original v1 CLI-driven aborts and the first SDK-era v2 rogue set.

Honesty notes

EExpired (2) and ENotOwner (6) are enforced by capability::enforce and capability::revoke but have no standalone recorded abort transaction. The four demonstrated capability aborts are 5/4/3/1.
The live enclave host (52.3.234.171) is torn down. The enclave’s ephemeral key is not persisted across restarts, so re-running produces a new key and a new Enclave id. The registered Enclave object and its key persist on-chain, which is why the forged-signature rejection could be captured after the host was stopped. To re-demo a live attested fill, re-run the enclave and re-register.